The EU Internal Market is a zone of free circulation of goods, services, capital, and people. At the same time, for the free circulation to be realized, it is necessary to ensure legal and institutional guarantees. The influence of cartels (consortiums of companies on a particular commodity), anti-competitive government interventions, different national policies, and the predominant position of giant digital companies in the market also affect the free circulation of goods in the EU.
The EU has a well-developed legal framework for ensuring competition in the internal market.
This legislation regulates anti-competitive agreements (article 101), abuse of dominance (article 102), and state aid (article 107). Recently, EU legislation has been developing digital-specific regulations, such as the DMA and DSA, to ensure the competitiveness of the EU internal market in the digital economy. EU competition law appears to be one of the most effective ways to ensure openness and competitiveness in the EU. In addition, it should be noted that such competition laws enable not only to ensure the free circulation of goods in the EU but also to enhance the competitiveness of enterprises. For instance, the EU should consolidate its tools for regulating entry barriers and separation of competition policy from economic policy to enhance the free circulation of goods within EU member states. Moreover, to ensure the free circulation of goods in the EU, it would be useful to develop competition policy oversight authorities to ensure and enforce regulations in the digital economy.
Algorithmic systems increasingly mediate welfare delivery, policing, taxation, public services, and judicial administration in India. Their attraction lies in scale, speed, and the promise of consistent decision-making. Their constitutional difficulty lies in the fact that a computational output can distribute burdens and benefits without making its reasons intelligible to the person affected. This article develops a Rawlsian jurisprudence for Indian algorithmic governance. It argues that the original position and the veil of ignorance provide a disciplined test for institutional design: decision-makers should choose rules without knowing whether they will be digitally included or excluded, data-rich or data-poor, socially dominant or historically marginalised, or the beneficiary of an automated classification or its adverse subject. Rawls’s equal basic liberties, fair equality of opportunity, and difference principle are translated into constitutional requirements of legality, non-arbitrariness, proportionality, explainability, contestability, and protection against wrongful exclusion. The article situates this normative framework within Indian debates on Articles 14 and 21, privacy, Aadhaar-linked welfare, algorithmic bias, and administrative accountability. It proposes a rights-preserving architecture consisting of a public algorithm register, mandatory pre-deployment impact assessments, meaningful reasons, human review, independent audits, accessible remedies, and a non-waivable analogue route for essential entitlements. Rawlsian reasoning does not require India to reject automation. It requires the State to ensure that automation remains publicly justifiable to those who bear its risks.
Code of Civil Procedure (hereafter ‘CPC’) provides provisions for filing of civil suits, interpleader suits and suits of common law remedies like injunction. These remedies are destined to provide efficacious relief to the litigants in conformance to the principles of equity, justice and good conscience. This paper endeavours to decipher the provisions of law on execution in particular reference to the rights of the judgment debtor on sale of movable properties. The paper aims to analyze the text of sub-rule (3) of Rule 77 of Order XXI of CPC to weigh the rights of a judgment debtor and a co-owner in a suit of execution of decree for sale of movable property.
At the outset, the Supreme Court clarified that the petitions forming the present batch had been instituted before the subsequent legislative changes. The reference was therefore examined in the statutory setting of Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and not by applying the later legislative regime as though it governed the original proceedings.
The judgment discussed in this paper was delivered by a nine-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court on 20 August 2026 in State of Uttar Pradesh v Jai Bir Singh. The dispute began as a question whether the Social Forestry Department of a State is an “industry”, and the Bench answered the reference through five separate opinions rather than one common judgment.[1] The one point on which all nine Judges agreed is that disputes still pending under the 1947 Act must be decided on the Triple Test as it stood in 1978.[2]
[1] The judgment carries the neutral citation 2026 INSC 897. See Supreme Court Observer, ‘Definition of “Industry” - Case Page’ (Supreme Court Observer, last updated 25 August 2026) <https://www.scobserver.in/cases/uttar-pradesh-jai-bir-singh-definition-of-industry-case-background/> accessed 28 September 2026; Agatha Shukla, ‘“Triple Test” For “Industry” Laid Down In 1978 Bangalore Water Supply Case Will Govern All Pending Disputes Under Repealed Industrial Disputes Act: Supreme Court’s 9-Judges Bench Clarifies’ (Verdictum, 22 August 2026) <https://www.verdictum.in/supreme-court/state-of-uttar-pradesh-v-jai-bir-singh-2026-insc-897-1978-triple-test-for-industry-9-judge-bench-1620398> accessed 28 September 2026.
[2] Namrata Banerjee and Debjani M, ‘Definition of Industry | Judgement Summary’ (Supreme Court Observer, 21 August 2026) <https://www.scobserver.in/reports/definition-of-industry-judgement-summary-2/> accessed 28 September 2026; ‘Understanding the Judgment of the 9-Judge Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in the BWSSB vs Rajappa Reference’ (All India Lawyers’ Association for Justice, 24 August 2026) <https://ailaj.wordpress.com/2026/08/24/understanding-the-judgment-of-the-9-judge-constitution-bench-of-the-apex-court-in-the-bwssb-vs-rajappa-reference/> accessed 28 September 2026.
Peaceful protest is an essential element of a democratic society since it allows individuals and groups to express their disagreement collectively, communicate their complaints and call for government accountability. It is a fundamental aspect of democracy because it provides citizens with a means of collectively raising their grievances against the government. Even though the Indian Constitution does not expressly mention a right to protest, the Supreme Court has recognized it as a fundamental right that comes from other articles.[1] Article 19(1)(a) guarantees the right to free speech and expression, and Article 19(1)(b) guarantees the right to assemble peacefully.[2] While these articles are protected from unreasonable state interference, they do allow the state to exercise reasonable restrictions that are mentioned in Articles 19(2) and 19(3). The Indian judiciary has been faced with the task of trying to find a balance between these rights and the State’s obligation to uphold the order of the society.[3]
The protests of 2026 at Jantar Mantar in New Delhi present a contemporary example of the issues faced with the balancing obligations. The protests, started primarily by youth and aligned with the Cockroach Janta Party (CJP), began in June and focused on issues of irregularities in national examinations, accountability in the education system and issues of examination governance. The protests gained national focus after a hunger strike was conducted and the participants engaged in confrontation with the police. The protests gained the national focus and sparked the concern of the protesters with regard to the appropriate of surveillance technologies including facial recognition and issues with police actions.[4] The balancing of the right to free and peaceful assembly of the protest participants and balancing the right of other citizens and the obligation of the State to uphold order has been addressed by the Supreme Court of India in previous cases where it recognized the right to protest as a fundamental right.[5]
This paper analyses the 2026 Jantar Mantar protests from a human-rights perspective by examining constitutional protections, judicial precedent, international human-rights standards and the principles of legality, necessity and proportionality. It posits that the State has a right to regulate peaceful demonstrations, but such regulations should enable - as opposed to completely obstruct - the right to protest. Thus, any use of force, detention, surveillance, or restriction on the right to protest must meet constitutional and human rights standards and must be justified and proportional.
[1] Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan v. Union of India, (2018) 17 SCC 324.
[2] INDIA CONST. art. 19(1)(a)-(b).
[3] INDIA CONST. art. 19, cls. 2–3.
[4] Ananthakrishnan G., How Facial Recognition Was Used for CJP Protest: Delhi Police to Supreme Court, INDIAN EXPRESS (last visited Aug. 18, 2026), <https://indianexpress.com/article/legal-news/delhi-police-facial-recognition-jantar-mantar-protest-supreme-court-10838147/>
[5] Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan v. Union of India, (2018) 17 SCC 324.
Election manifestos occupy an important but legally uncertain position within a constitutional democracy. They communicate the policies, programmes and proposed measures of political parties to the electorate and may substantially influence electoral choice. In India, manifestos frequently contain promises concerning employment, education, healthcare, subsidies, social welfare, taxation, infrastructure, institutional reform and distribution of public resources. The constitutional question is whether such promises, particularly after an electoral victory, can create obligations enforceable against the government. This article examines that question from the perspective of Constitutional Law and jurisprudence. It argues that a political promise contained in an election manifesto does not ordinarily become a constitutional obligation merely because the political party making the promise obtains an electoral mandate. The constitutional source of governmental authority is the Constitution and the laws made under it, rather than the manifesto itself. Electoral victory creates political authority within the constitutional framework, but it does not transform every political commitment into a justiciable legal right. At the same time, manifesto promises cannot be treated as entirely irrelevant to constitutional governance. They operate within an electoral process regulated by constitutional institutions, particularly the Election Commission of India under Article 324. The Supreme Court’s decision in S. Subramaniam Balaji v. State of Tamil Nadu recognised the electoral significance of manifesto promises and directed the Election Commission to frame guidelines concerning their contents. The Election Commission subsequently incorporated manifesto guidelines into the Model Code of Conduct, requiring, among other things, consistency with constitutional ideals and transparency regarding the rationale and financial means of promises. The article further examines whether Articles 14 and 21, the Directive Principles of State Policy, constitutional morality, legitimate expectation and judicial review can convert political promises into constitutional obligations. It argues that these provisions and doctrines may make the implementation of a manifesto promise constitutionally reviewable, but they do not ordinarily make the original promise itself enforceable. A promise may acquire legal force where it is subsequently incorporated into legislation, statutory rules, governmental orders, binding policy instruments or another recognised source of law. Similarly, governmental action taken pursuant to a manifesto may be invalidated if it violates fundamental rights, constitutional limitations, statutory requirements or principles of non-arbitrariness. The article therefore distinguishes between political accountability and constitutional accountability. Failure to fulfil a manifesto promise may ordinarily be a matter of electoral and parliamentary accountability; unlawful implementation of the promise is a matter of legal and constitutional accountability. The central thesis is that an electoral mandate cannot override constitutional supremacy, but neither should constitutional adjudication automatically convert political programmes into judicially enforceable commands. The constitutional position requires a principled boundary between political commitment and legal obligation, while ensuring that governmental power exercised in pursuit of electoral promises remains subject to constitutional review.
