The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) upholds the protection and preservation of human rights universally. Governments across the globe have thus committed to protecting the human rights of every section of society. Children's human rights in the contemporary digital era have become a core area of concern that calls for greater attention. Currently, children constitutes around one-third of total internet users because digital platforms and technologies such as artificial intelligence are becoming more accessible. Thus, it has become imperative to ensures that children are not exposed to harmful content, privacy violations, manipulative design and commercial exploitation while using digital spaces. Digital platforms have become an indispensable part of children's lives because of their increased engagement across multiple levels, such as homes, educational institutions and peer groups. These digital transformations have exposed children to greater risks and necessitate safeguarding children's human rights online. Accordingly, efforts at both global and individual levels have focused on creating safer digital spaces for children.
The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and General Comment No. 25 fundamentally provide for the protection of children’s privacy, safety and participation online. In India, the protect children's human rights in digital spaces. Ironically, challenges such as privacy and data protection violations, online safety and exploitation persists. The inadequate legal and regulatory frameworks, weak enforcement mechanisms, digital disparity, limited digital literacy and participation have increased the vulnerability of children’s rights online. The present paper, therefore, aims to study the key human rights of children in the digital era globally as well as in India. The paper is in nature, based on qualitative data drawn from secondary data. It therefore aims to examine the existing legal and administrative mechanisms for the protection of children's rights in digital spaces in India and across the globe. It further suggests that creating safer digital spaces requires robust legislation, child-centric design and greater education and awareness among children to mitigate online threats and risks.
Criminal law defines what is considered to be sufficiently undesirable for society to take action against. It explains what acts or failures to act are criminal offences, when a person may be held responsible, and what subsequent procedures and penalties may follow. In contrast to a dispute between private parties, a criminal case is brought by the state on behalf of the public, and the punishments may include imprisonment, fines, restrictions on liberty, and social censure. Consequently, it is necessary to both protect the public and safeguard the rights of the accused.
The exact nature of criminal law varies between jurisdictions. The definitions of criminal offences, available defences and sentencing guidelines will be determined by a particular jurisdiction’s statutes and case law. However, there are a number of principles that are generally recognised.
Environmental governance is changing fast. Problems in the natural world keep growing. At the same time, money needs and new technology are moving ahead. Law is now pulled into this mix more than before. This work looks at a new area where environmental rules meet digital tools. In this space, environmental law is not only about traditional regulation but it also touches sustainability goals, fairness for affected communities, trade-offs tied to the economy, and fresh technology methods. The paper reviews how economic ideas help with sustainable development. It looks at the polluter pays principle, methods for valuing the environment, carbon markets, green finance, and ways to push environmental costs back onto those who cause harm. It then turns to new tools that are starting to matter. This includes artificial intelligence, remote sensing, satellite-based monitoring, blockchain, and systems that use environmental data to guide decisions. These tools may help with compliance checks, better tracking, clearer reporting, and more solid climate choices. It mentions the risk of bias in algorithms. It discusses who controls environmental data and how rules can be enforced fairly. It notes that new technology may not reach everyone in the same way. The paper puts ecological justice first. It also highlights fairness between generations. It stresses environmental rights and the concerns of people who are often left out. Purely legal changes may not be enough. Economic tools alone will fall short. Even technology by itself will not solve the whole issue. Instead, the paper calls for one joined approach. In that view, law, the economy, ecology, and technology must connect and work at the same time. It then looks at new legal areas that could support fresh ideas. The goal is to encourage change without harming nature. It also aims to protect fair distribution and long-term sustainability. In the end, the paper imagines a legal system that can respond as things shift. It would guide both the green transition and the digital transition. At the same time, it keeps human rights, environmental protection, and accountability as key parts.
Moral policing represents a pervasive socio-legal pathology wherein non-state actors, self-appointed vigilantes, and cultural groups extra-judicially enforce perceived moral, cultural, or religious norms upon individuals. This research analytical essay critically investigates the spectrum of criminal offences arising out of moral policing, ranging from physical assault, wrongful confinement, and extortion to gender-based violence, cyber-stalking, and mob lynching. Evaluating statutory criminal law provisions alongside constitutional guarantees of personal liberty, privacy, and bodily autonomy, this paper demonstrates how moral policing subverts the rule of law and infringes fundamental rights. It further scrutinizes police inaction, structural complicity, and the judicial guidelines issued to curb mob vigilantism, concluding with comprehensive legislative and administrative reform proposals.
The Supreme Court’s judgment in Jaskaran Jeet Singh Deol v. State of Punjab examines the constitutional consequences of arrest and detention in violation of Article 22(1) and Article 22(2). The appellant was arrested in a criminal case but was not supplied written grounds of arrest and was produced before a Magistrate beyond the constitutionally prescribed twenty-four-hour period. The Magistrate directed his release. The central question was whether the investigating agency could subsequently re-arrest him in the same case and, if so, under what safeguards.
The Court distinguishes release resulting from unconstitutional custody from ordinary bail and default bail. It holds that the safeguards under Article 22 are mandatory and that their breach vitiates the arrest or remand. Where the State seeks renewed custody after such a breach, it must disclose the grounds of arrest, explain the earlier non-compliance, obtain endorsement from the immediate superior authority, and seek the Magistrate’s permission. The Court also recognizes that public-law compensation may be available for an Article 22(2) violation.
This commentary analyses the decision’s contribution to arrest jurisprudence, judicial supervision and institutional accountability, while identifying questions concerning the threshold for permission, urgent investigative needs and compensation. The judgment concerns constitutional procedure; it does not determine the merits of the underlying allegations.
“Section 479 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS)” tells the State when it must stop holding an undertrial prisoner: once the accused has served one-half of the maximum sentence for the alleged offence, or one-third if he is a first-time offender. It also, unusually, puts the first step on the jail superintendent and not on the prisoner. This paper asks whether section 479 has turned the undertrial’s constitutional claim to liberty into an entitlement that actually delivers release. It argues that the provision makes two real advances over “section 436A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973”, the first-time offender threshold and the superintendent’s duty, but retains or introduces three weaknesses: a reliance on the statutory maximum as a clock, an unclear bar on release where multiple cases are pending, and dependence on the same institutional chain that failed under the old law. Using the text of the provision, the Supreme Court’s supervision in In Re: Inhuman Conditions in 1382 Prisons, a Karnataka High Court reading of section 479(2), and “the National Legal Services Authority’s quarterly data on Under Trial Review Committees for April to June 2025”, the paper shows that identification and release under the provision remain thin compared with the size of the undertrial population. It closes with doctrinal and administrative proposals aimed at turning a promise of release into a routine one.
