The conclusion of the India–European Union Free Trade Agreement on 27 January 2026 left its investment pillar unbuilt. Investment protection was assigned to a separate Investment Protection Agreement (IPA), negotiated in parallel since June 2022 and still unconcluded. Meanwhile, European investments made in India after the 2017 termination of India’s bilateral investment treaties with twenty-two EU member states enjoy no treaty protection at all. This article examines the institutional question at the centre of the negotiation: whether disputes under a future IPA should be resolved by the European Union’s two-tier Investment Court System (ICS) or by the state-to-state mechanisms that now characterise India’s trade agreements. It traces the arbitral experience behind India’s 2016 Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, the constraints that EU constitutional law places on any dispute settlement design after Opinion 2/15, Achmea and Opinion 1/17, and India’s treaty practice through 2026, including the pending revision of its Model BIT. Drawing on the literature on institutional choice in investment law, it argues that the two positions are less opposed than the binary suggests. Both reject ad hoc, party-appointed arbitration, and both seek interpretive control by the treaty parties. The real obstacles lie in four narrower issues: exhaustion of local remedies, the taxation carve-out, most-favoured-nation treatment and the enforceability of awards in India. The article proposes a model of “sequenced standing adjudication” that combines dispute prevention, a time-limited domestic remedies phase and state-to-state filters with a bilateral standing court docked to multilateral reform.
Aayush Sharma, Dr. Neelanjana Ganguly Shukla, Darshi Sharma Guhey
The debate surrounding gender-neutral laws in India raises fundamental questions concerning constitutional equality, substantive justice, individual dignity and the scope of criminal liability. Indian legislation has historically incorporated gender-specific protections to address structural discrimination and gender-based violence. However, the persistence of gender-specific definitions of certain offences has generated concerns regarding the legal recognition of male and transgender victims, the scope of protection available to non-binary persons, and the relationship between protective legislation and equality before the law. The enactment of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), alongside contemporary judicial developments, provides a significant opportunity to reassess the adequacy of the existing framework. This paper examines the constitutional foundations of gender neutrality under Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution of India and analyses selected provisions of the BNS, the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013, and the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. It critically evaluates judicial developments in National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India, Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, Hiral P. Harsora v. Kusum Narottamdas Harsora, Joseph Shine v. Union of India and Janshruti (People’s Voice) v. Union of India. Particular attention is given to the tension between inclusive legal recognition and the continuing justification for special measures addressing gender-based disadvantage. The paper adopts a doctrinal and analytical methodology, supplemented by relevant empirical scholarship, to argue that gender neutrality should not be understood as the universal removal of gender-specific protections. Instead, it should operate as a context-sensitive legislative principle guided by the nature of the harm, constitutional justification, equality of access to remedies and the preservation of substantive protection for vulnerable groups. The paper proposes a framework for identifying unjustified statutory exclusions and advancing inclusive, effective and constitutionally defensible legal reform.
The original handwritten Constitution of India contains a distinctive visual programme of illustrations accompanying its Parts. This article examines those illustrations as a possible visual vocabulary through which the Constitution may be read alongside ideas associated with ancient Indian jurisprudence. It focuses on Dharma, Raj-dharma, duties of rulers, welfare, pluralism, restraint in the exercise of power, and collective welfare, and considers how those ideas may illuminate the constitutional subjects placed alongside particular illustrations. The article argues that the illustrations are neither legally operative provisions nor merely ornamental artwork. They can instead provide historical and cultural context for understanding the constitutional imagination of the document, provided that symbolic interpretation is distinguished from demonstrable evidence of the framers' subjective intent. The article therefore develops a thematic reading of the illustrations in relation to fundamental rights, directive principles, federalism, local self-government, social justice, elections, emergency powers, and constitutional change. It also compares the Indian approach with selected constitutional traditions that incorporate civilizational or indigenous concepts. The study concludes that the illustrations enrich the historical understanding of Indian constitutionalism, but their interpretive value must remain subordinate to the constitutional text, structure, and established methods of legal interpretation.
India has made significant shifts towards digital banking, using UPI, mobile banking, cards and net banking to make payments faster and cheaper. However, as a result of these developments, the risk of banking fraud has shifted from the branch counter to the customer’s phone. In cases where a customer’s bank account is debited without her authority, the law in India attempts to answer the question as to who should bear that loss – the bank or the customer. This paper discusses the law on this issue in India. It begins by discussing the relationship between the banker and the customer, then analyses the Reserve Bank of India’s circular of 6 July 2017 on limiting the liability of customers. It also analyses the approach of the courts; in particular the Gauhati High Court and the Supreme Court in State Bank of India v. Pallabh Bhowmick. Furthermore, the paper investigates the remedies available to customers under the Consumer Protection Act 2019, the Information Technology Act 2000 and the RBI Integrated Ombudsman Scheme. Additionally, the paper evaluates the RBI’s 2026 amendment directions on digital fraud compensation for small values. The Indian law on this issue is also compared to the laws of the United Kingdom, the United States and Singapore. The paper argues that the 2017 RBI framework is sound in principle, but could be improved with more specific standards, better enforcement and changes to accommodate socially engineered fraud. Finally, specific suggestions are made for the reform of the digital fraud compensation framework.
The foundation of a free, fair, and inclusive electoral system in India is a reliable electoral roll. The continued presence of deceased persons, duplicate entries, or other ineligible persons on electoral rolls may affect the integrity of elections. On the other hand, if the names of eligible citizens are erroneously deleted during the process of purification of electoral rolls due to faulty verification, documentary discrepancies, inadequate notice, or ineffective grievance redressal, citizens’ democratic participation may be adversely affected. The Special Intensive Revision (SIR) is an important example of this dual challenge. The present research paper examines the powers, procedural obligations, and voter rights of the Election Commission under Articles 324, 326, and 329 of the Constitution of India, the Representation of the People Act, 1950, and the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960. The empirical basis of this study comprises the SIR conducted in Bihar in 2025 and the revision process and related judicial proceedings conducted in West Bengal during 2025–2026. According to official data published by the Election Commission and the Government of India, approximately 7.89 crore electors were registered in Bihar on 24 June 2025, whereas approximately 7.24 crore electors were included in the draft electoral roll published on 1 August 2025. The final electoral roll published on 30 September 2025 recorded approximately 7.42 crore electors. In West Bengal, 7,66,37,529 electors were registered as of 27 October 2025, whereas the draft electoral roll published on 16 December 2025 recorded 7,08,16,630 electors. The press release issued by the Chief Electoral Officer of West Bengal on 28 February 2026 reported a total of 6,44,52,609 electors in the final roll. The differences among these figures must be understood in the context of the respective stages of revision, claims, objections, and cases pending adjudication. The validity of the Bihar SIR was upheld by the Supreme Court on 27 May 2026 in Association for Democratic Reforms v. Election Commission of India. In West Bengal, by contrast, separate judicial and administrative questions emerged concerning the implementation of the process, the large number of cases pending adjudication, the workload of appellate tribunals, and the functionality of the digital portal. According to reports published in September 2026 concerning information submitted by the Election Commission to the Supreme Court, approximately 38.20 lakh appeals relating to the West Bengal SIR had been filed, of which approximately 1.02 lakh had been disposed of. Reports published in October 2026 also indicated that certain tribunals had raised concerns regarding the issuance of notices, the conduct of hearings, and the restoration of names due to difficulties associated with the digital portal. Throughout this administrative process, and during the functioning of the Election Commission under the leadership of Chief Election Commissioner Gyanesh Kumar, a prominent debate also emerged concerning the relationship between the Commission’s decisions and the alleged political interests and support of the current Modi Government at the Centre. Opposition leaders and parties—including Rahul Gandhi, Sanjay Singh, Mamata Banerjee, Arvind Kejriwal, and the Kakroach Janata Party (KJP)—staged strong protests against these revision exercises and levelled serious allegations that the Election Commission was working in favour of the ruling party. In contrast, the Modi Government at the Centre and the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) openly defended Gyanesh Kumar and the actions of the Election Commission, describing the exercise as a necessary measure to ensure electoral integrity. At the same time, a substantial section of the media, commonly referred to in public discourse as “Godi Media,” consistently adopted a position justifying and defending the actions of the Government and the Election Commission amid these controversies. The research examines these developments on the basis of official records of the Election Commission, judicial orders, political responses, and credible reports, classifying them according to different levels of evidentiary reliability. The central argument of the study is that electoral roll accuracy and the inclusion of eligible citizens are not mutually contradictory objectives. Achieving both requires transparent procedures, reliable verification, reasoned decisions, time-bound appeals, independent review, and publicly verifiable data.
The growing use of digital platforms has made the collection and processing of personal data a part of everyday life. While consent is often treated as the primary means of protecting individual privacy, the reality is more complicated. Lengthy privacy policies, limited alternatives and unequal bargaining power can make it difficult for individuals to understand what they are agreeing to or to exercise genuine control over their personal information. This article examines the consent framework under India's Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, in light of the constitutional recognition of privacy by the Supreme Court in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India. It argues that consent remains important but cannot, on its own, provide adequate protection in a digital environment where individuals may lack the information or practical freedom needed to make informed choices. The article therefore emphasises the need for clear privacy notices, responsible data processing, accessible grievance redressal and stronger institutional accountability. It concludes that meaningful data protection requires more than obtaining an individual's agreement; it requires a framework in which organisations are held responsible for how personal data is collected, used and protected.
