Election manifestos occupy an important but legally uncertain position within a constitutional democracy. They communicate the policies, programmes and proposed measures of political parties to the electorate and may substantially influence electoral choice. In India, manifestos frequently contain promises concerning employment, education, healthcare, subsidies, social welfare, taxation, infrastructure, institutional reform and distribution of public resources. The constitutional question is whether such promises, particularly after an electoral victory, can create obligations enforceable against the government. This article examines that question from the perspective of Constitutional Law and jurisprudence. It argues that a political promise contained in an election manifesto does not ordinarily become a constitutional obligation merely because the political party making the promise obtains an electoral mandate. The constitutional source of governmental authority is the Constitution and the laws made under it, rather than the manifesto itself. Electoral victory creates political authority within the constitutional framework, but it does not transform every political commitment into a justiciable legal right. At the same time, manifesto promises cannot be treated as entirely irrelevant to constitutional governance. They operate within an electoral process regulated by constitutional institutions, particularly the Election Commission of India under Article 324. The Supreme Court’s decision in S. Subramaniam Balaji v. State of Tamil Nadu recognised the electoral significance of manifesto promises and directed the Election Commission to frame guidelines concerning their contents. The Election Commission subsequently incorporated manifesto guidelines into the Model Code of Conduct, requiring, among other things, consistency with constitutional ideals and transparency regarding the rationale and financial means of promises. The article further examines whether Articles 14 and 21, the Directive Principles of State Policy, constitutional morality, legitimate expectation and judicial review can convert political promises into constitutional obligations. It argues that these provisions and doctrines may make the implementation of a manifesto promise constitutionally reviewable, but they do not ordinarily make the original promise itself enforceable. A promise may acquire legal force where it is subsequently incorporated into legislation, statutory rules, governmental orders, binding policy instruments or another recognised source of law. Similarly, governmental action taken pursuant to a manifesto may be invalidated if it violates fundamental rights, constitutional limitations, statutory requirements or principles of non-arbitrariness. The article therefore distinguishes between political accountability and constitutional accountability. Failure to fulfil a manifesto promise may ordinarily be a matter of electoral and parliamentary accountability; unlawful implementation of the promise is a matter of legal and constitutional accountability. The central thesis is that an electoral mandate cannot override constitutional supremacy, but neither should constitutional adjudication automatically convert political programmes into judicially enforceable commands. The constitutional position requires a principled boundary between political commitment and legal obligation, while ensuring that governmental power exercised in pursuit of electoral promises remains subject to constitutional review.
At the outset, the Supreme Court clarified that the petitions forming the present batch had been instituted before the subsequent legislative changes. The reference was therefore examined in the statutory setting of Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and not by applying the later legislative regime as though it governed the original proceedings.
The judgment discussed in this paper was delivered by a nine-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court on 20 August 2026 in State of Uttar Pradesh v Jai Bir Singh. The dispute began as a question whether the Social Forestry Department of a State is an “industry”, and the Bench answered the reference through five separate opinions rather than one common judgment.[1] The one point on which all nine Judges agreed is that disputes still pending under the 1947 Act must be decided on the Triple Test as it stood in 1978.[2]
[1] The judgment carries the neutral citation 2026 INSC 897. See Supreme Court Observer, ‘Definition of “Industry” - Case Page’ (Supreme Court Observer, last updated 25 August 2026) <https://www.scobserver.in/cases/uttar-pradesh-jai-bir-singh-definition-of-industry-case-background/> accessed 28 September 2026; Agatha Shukla, ‘“Triple Test” For “Industry” Laid Down In 1978 Bangalore Water Supply Case Will Govern All Pending Disputes Under Repealed Industrial Disputes Act: Supreme Court’s 9-Judges Bench Clarifies’ (Verdictum, 22 August 2026) <https://www.verdictum.in/supreme-court/state-of-uttar-pradesh-v-jai-bir-singh-2026-insc-897-1978-triple-test-for-industry-9-judge-bench-1620398> accessed 28 September 2026.
[2] Namrata Banerjee and Debjani M, ‘Definition of Industry | Judgement Summary’ (Supreme Court Observer, 21 August 2026) <https://www.scobserver.in/reports/definition-of-industry-judgement-summary-2/> accessed 28 September 2026; ‘Understanding the Judgment of the 9-Judge Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in the BWSSB vs Rajappa Reference’ (All India Lawyers’ Association for Justice, 24 August 2026) <https://ailaj.wordpress.com/2026/08/24/understanding-the-judgment-of-the-9-judge-constitution-bench-of-the-apex-court-in-the-bwssb-vs-rajappa-reference/> accessed 28 September 2026.
Peaceful protest is an essential element of a democratic society since it allows individuals and groups to express their disagreement collectively, communicate their complaints and call for government accountability. It is a fundamental aspect of democracy because it provides citizens with a means of collectively raising their grievances against the government. Even though the Indian Constitution does not expressly mention a right to protest, the Supreme Court has recognized it as a fundamental right that comes from other articles.[1] Article 19(1)(a) guarantees the right to free speech and expression, and Article 19(1)(b) guarantees the right to assemble peacefully.[2] While these articles are protected from unreasonable state interference, they do allow the state to exercise reasonable restrictions that are mentioned in Articles 19(2) and 19(3). The Indian judiciary has been faced with the task of trying to find a balance between these rights and the State’s obligation to uphold the order of the society.[3]
The protests of 2026 at Jantar Mantar in New Delhi present a contemporary example of the issues faced with the balancing obligations. The protests, started primarily by youth and aligned with the Cockroach Janta Party (CJP), began in June and focused on issues of irregularities in national examinations, accountability in the education system and issues of examination governance. The protests gained national focus after a hunger strike was conducted and the participants engaged in confrontation with the police. The protests gained the national focus and sparked the concern of the protesters with regard to the appropriate of surveillance technologies including facial recognition and issues with police actions.[4] The balancing of the right to free and peaceful assembly of the protest participants and balancing the right of other citizens and the obligation of the State to uphold order has been addressed by the Supreme Court of India in previous cases where it recognized the right to protest as a fundamental right.[5]
This paper analyses the 2026 Jantar Mantar protests from a human-rights perspective by examining constitutional protections, judicial precedent, international human-rights standards and the principles of legality, necessity and proportionality. It posits that the State has a right to regulate peaceful demonstrations, but such regulations should enable - as opposed to completely obstruct - the right to protest. Thus, any use of force, detention, surveillance, or restriction on the right to protest must meet constitutional and human rights standards and must be justified and proportional.
[1] Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan v. Union of India, (2018) 17 SCC 324.
[2] INDIA CONST. art. 19(1)(a)-(b).
[3] INDIA CONST. art. 19, cls. 2–3.
[4] Ananthakrishnan G., How Facial Recognition Was Used for CJP Protest: Delhi Police to Supreme Court, INDIAN EXPRESS (last visited Aug. 18, 2026), <https://indianexpress.com/article/legal-news/delhi-police-facial-recognition-jantar-mantar-protest-supreme-court-10838147/>
[5] Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan v. Union of India, (2018) 17 SCC 324.
This comment looks at the Allahabad High Court's decision in the Aarushi Talwar case. The case is important because it explains how the presumption of innocence works in Indian criminal law, and what an appellate court should do when a conviction is based on circumstantial evidence.
The presumption of innocence means an accused person cannot be held guilty unless the prosecution proves its case beyond reasonable doubt. The trial must also be fair, without coercion or arbitrary decisions. This comment discusses Dr. Rajesh Talwar & Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, commonly called the Aarushi Talwar case or the Noida double murder case. It is worth studying not just for how it treats circumstantial evidence, but also for how it connects that standard to the right to a fair trial under Article 21 of the Constitution.
This concern is not merely theoretical. National Crime Records Bureau figures show that the conviction rate for offences under the Indian Penal Code has hovered around forty-six per cent in recent years, down from roughly sixty-four per cent when such data collection began in the 1950s, a decline that commentators attribute chiefly to inadequate investigation and weak prosecution rather than to any fall in criminal activity. Seen against this backdrop, an appellate court's willingness to scrutinise the completeness of a chain of circumstances, rather than simply defer to the trial court's findings, takes on added significance for the fairness of the criminal process as a whole.[1]
The trial court had convicted Aarushi's parents mainly on the strength of circumstantial evidence. The High Court later found this chain of circumstances incomplete, and said the trial court had not done enough to protect the accused from an arbitrary conviction. On appeal, the High Court went through this chain again and, applying the settled test for such cases, set the conviction aside.
The judgment was delivered on October 12, 2017. It is seen as one of the more important rulings of the Allahabad High Court in recent years, both because it reaffirmed the “chain of circumstances” rule and because it showed that the appellate process can correct a flawed conviction.
[1] Sankar Sen, Shoddy Probe, Prosecution Impeding Conviction, THE TRIBUNE (Jan. 16, 2025), https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/shoddy-probe-prosecution-impeding-conviction-34176.
ABSTRACT
Involuntary commitment—the practice of detaining and treating individuals with severe mental illnesses against their explicit consent—stands at a volatile crossroad between psychiatric medicine, legal frameworks, and human rights. In India, this practice underwent a monumental paradigm shift with the repeal of the Mental Health Act, 1987, and the implementation of the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017 (MHCA). The MHCA 2017 explicitly aligns Indian law with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD), centering patient autonomy, the right to choose, and the restriction of coercive emergency care. This paper evaluates the legal and ethical dimensions of rights-based legislation governing emergency psychiatric care in India. It examines the operational challenges of "supported admission" as a substitute for involuntary commitment, evaluates ethical tensions between medical beneficence and patient autonomy, and highlights systemic barriers such as infrastructural deficits, societal stigma, and implementation gaps. Ultimately, the paper suggests a balanced pathway toward safeguarding human rights without compromising essential emergency medical care.
The present research paper titled "The Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 in India: A Legal Study" provides an in-depth, theoretical, and critical analysis of the historic legislation enacted to provide legal and social security to the most vulnerable and marginalized communities (SC/ST) in Indian society. In order to realize the ideals of social justice, equality, and fraternity enshrined in the Preamble of the Indian Constitution, this special Act was enacted in the year 1989. The primary objective of this research paper is to evaluate the statutory provisions, historical background, and judicial interpretations of this Act over time using a theoretical research methodology. The study critically analyzes whether deep-rooted institutionalized and cultural prejudices can be eradicated solely through punitive legal frameworks. Furthermore, the paper examines the impact of the 2015 and 2018 legislative amendments, controversies surrounding anticipatory bail, and the legal scenarios emerging post landmark judgments. The theoretical analysis reveals that while the Act has fostered consciousness and a sense of security among Dalits and Adivasis, its desired outcomes have not been fully achieved due to procedural delays, administrative apathy, and deep-seated systemic biases. Finally, the paper offers practical legal recommendations, highlighting the role of exclusive special courts and institutional sensitization to make the Act more robust.
