Arbitration is often selected because it offers parties a private and comparatively flexible method of resolving disputes. Yet the value of an arbitral process depends not only on the tribunal's decision but also on whether the successful party can obtain the relief granted. This paper examines the legal journey from an arbitral award to its enforcement, focusing on domestic awards in India and foreign awards sought to be enforced in India. It analyses the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, particularly Sections 34-36 and Sections 44-49, alongside the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958 (New York Convention). It considers the distinction between setting aside a domestic award and resisting enforcement of a foreign award, the limited role of public policy, and the Supreme Court's approach in Bharat Aluminium Co. v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc., Shri Lal Mahal Ltd. v. Progetto Grano SpA, Ssangyong Engineering & Construction Co. Ltd. v. National Highways Authority of India, and Vijay Karia v. Prysmian Cavi E Sistemi SRL. The paper argues that Indian law generally supports finality while preserving safeguards for serious legal and procedural defects. Its central concern is the gap between an award becoming legally enforceable and the successful party actually receiving relief. It concludes that consistent judicial reasoning, proportionate case management, accessible procedural guidance, and effective execution practice are necessary to make enforcement more predictable without weakening legitimate safeguards.
The paper highlights the issue of "hallucinations" of AI-aided Indian Judiciary, stressing on the landmark Supreme Court pronouncement in Pooja Ramesh Singh v. J&K Bank Ltd. (2026). The apex court has declared an absolute xero-tolerance standard for AI-produced unverified precedents, upholding those citations to be professional misconduct under Section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961. The research paper examines the continuous tussle between the trap of efficiency of automatic legal research and the fundamental constitutional safeguards enshrined in Article 21, that includes the right of a fair trial and speedy justice. Comparing with international judicial pronouncements like the Mata v. Avianca, this study advocates that AI-produced unverified precedents divert the rule of law and vitiate the evidentiary efficacy of adjudication. At last, the paper argues for a strong regulation that makes human verification mandatory, protects judicial decision-making, and transforms judicial education to a antagonistic research pedagogy, guaranteeing that technology is a supportive mechanism that does not jeopardize truth and justice.
In July of 2026, the Supreme Court of India held that a decision based on an AI's hallucination as to what the law is, is "no decision at all." Although the Supreme Court made a good decision on a very limited constitutional basis, the Supreme Court's holding will be an ex post facto blunt instrument, unless there is a procedural obligation placed on the decision maker. Nullity is based on the constitutional rights to fair procedure (Articles 14 and 21) and the requirement of a reasoned decision. A default rule of nullity is better than a materiality test. The most appropriate response would be a technology-neutral duty to verify each authority relied upon against a primary source, to document that verification, and to notify the parties when the court relies upon authority that neither party has cited. When the Draft Regulations for Use of Artificial Intelligence in Courts (2026) are reviewed by the Supreme Court, the proposed regulations state that the verification exemption will not apply to legal authority.
The conclusion of the India–European Union Free Trade Agreement on 27 January 2026 left its investment pillar unbuilt. Investment protection was assigned to a separate Investment Protection Agreement (IPA), negotiated in parallel since June 2022 and still unconcluded. Meanwhile, European investments made in India after the 2017 termination of India’s bilateral investment treaties with twenty-two EU member states enjoy no treaty protection at all. This article examines the institutional question at the centre of the negotiation: whether disputes under a future IPA should be resolved by the European Union’s two-tier Investment Court System (ICS) or by the state-to-state mechanisms that now characterise India’s trade agreements. It traces the arbitral experience behind India’s 2016 Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, the constraints that EU constitutional law places on any dispute settlement design after Opinion 2/15, Achmea and Opinion 1/17, and India’s treaty practice through 2026, including the pending revision of its Model BIT. Drawing on the literature on institutional choice in investment law, it argues that the two positions are less opposed than the binary suggests. Both reject ad hoc, party-appointed arbitration, and both seek interpretive control by the treaty parties. The real obstacles lie in four narrower issues: exhaustion of local remedies, the taxation carve-out, most-favoured-nation treatment and the enforceability of awards in India. The article proposes a model of “sequenced standing adjudication” that combines dispute prevention, a time-limited domestic remedies phase and state-to-state filters with a bilateral standing court docked to multilateral reform.
Aayush Sharma, Dr. Neelanjana Ganguly Shukla, Darshi Sharma Guhey
The debate surrounding gender-neutral laws in India raises fundamental questions concerning constitutional equality, substantive justice, individual dignity and the scope of criminal liability. Indian legislation has historically incorporated gender-specific protections to address structural discrimination and gender-based violence. However, the persistence of gender-specific definitions of certain offences has generated concerns regarding the legal recognition of male and transgender victims, the scope of protection available to non-binary persons, and the relationship between protective legislation and equality before the law. The enactment of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), alongside contemporary judicial developments, provides a significant opportunity to reassess the adequacy of the existing framework. This paper examines the constitutional foundations of gender neutrality under Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution of India and analyses selected provisions of the BNS, the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013, and the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. It critically evaluates judicial developments in National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India, Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, Hiral P. Harsora v. Kusum Narottamdas Harsora, Joseph Shine v. Union of India and Janshruti (People’s Voice) v. Union of India. Particular attention is given to the tension between inclusive legal recognition and the continuing justification for special measures addressing gender-based disadvantage. The paper adopts a doctrinal and analytical methodology, supplemented by relevant empirical scholarship, to argue that gender neutrality should not be understood as the universal removal of gender-specific protections. Instead, it should operate as a context-sensitive legislative principle guided by the nature of the harm, constitutional justification, equality of access to remedies and the preservation of substantive protection for vulnerable groups. The paper proposes a framework for identifying unjustified statutory exclusions and advancing inclusive, effective and constitutionally defensible legal reform.
The original handwritten Constitution of India contains a distinctive visual programme of illustrations accompanying its Parts. This article examines those illustrations as a possible visual vocabulary through which the Constitution may be read alongside ideas associated with ancient Indian jurisprudence. It focuses on Dharma, Raj-dharma, duties of rulers, welfare, pluralism, restraint in the exercise of power, and collective welfare, and considers how those ideas may illuminate the constitutional subjects placed alongside particular illustrations. The article argues that the illustrations are neither legally operative provisions nor merely ornamental artwork. They can instead provide historical and cultural context for understanding the constitutional imagination of the document, provided that symbolic interpretation is distinguished from demonstrable evidence of the framers' subjective intent. The article therefore develops a thematic reading of the illustrations in relation to fundamental rights, directive principles, federalism, local self-government, social justice, elections, emergency powers, and constitutional change. It also compares the Indian approach with selected constitutional traditions that incorporate civilizational or indigenous concepts. The study concludes that the illustrations enrich the historical understanding of Indian constitutionalism, but their interpretive value must remain subordinate to the constitutional text, structure, and established methods of legal interpretation.
