Barrier To Entry: Rethinking Abuse Of Dominance In The Age Of Digital Markets

Abstract

In the digital economy, market power is no longer defined solely by traditional metrics such as price control or output restriction. Instead, it is increasingly entrenched by control over data, network effects, algorithmic design, and platform intermediation. This research explores the evolving contours of “abuse of dominance” in the context of digital markets, with a specific focus on how new forms of entry barriers—such as data monopolization, lock-in effects, and self-preferencing—reshape competition law enforcement. While traditional antitrust tools emphasized output and pricing models, they often fall short in addressing exclusionary conduct that impedes innovation and consumer choice in the digital economy. This paper critically evaluates the adequacy of India’s Competition Act, 2002 in regulating such barriers and draws comparisons with the European Union’s Digital Markets Act and jurisprudence under Article 102 TFEU. The analysis further reflects on the challenges faced by the Competition Commission of India in market definition, evidence thresholds, and the need for ex-ante tools. Through a comparative and doctrinal lens, the paper proposes a recalibration of legal standards to recognize and address abuse rooted in digital architecture rather than merely pricing strategies.