Hohfeld's Theory of Jural Relations and Its Relevance to Modern Legal Rights

Abstract

Wesley Hohfeld's breakdown of legal rights into eight essential concepts has persisted for more than a hundred years, yet there is debate about its relevance in explaining contemporary rights. This article inquires if the framework continues to be analytically valuable for determining what current constitutional and statutory rights provide, to what extent the power & liability and immunity & disability relationships clarify protections that the terminology of right and duty may obscure, and where the framework encounters its limitations. Through an examination of legal principles and case law concerning Indian constitutional rulings and legislations, such as the Right to Information Act 2005, and notable cases including Navtej Singh Johar, Supriyo, Shayara Bano, Kesavananda Bharati, Puttaswamy, and the Digital Personal Data Protection Act 2023, while contrasting these with the will-interest debate, Halpin's critical simplifications, and MacDonald's recent institutional analysis, this study posits that Hohfeld's framework is most effectively viewed as a diagnostic grammar of rights rather than a theory that provides justification. It reveals the underlying structure of combined rights, demonstrates that a significant number of constitutional guarantees act as immunities safeguarded by disabilities, and recognizes consent-driven systems as exercises of legal authority. It is least effective for positive rights that do not have a clearly defined duty-bearer and provides no insight into the rationale for the existence of rights. The article concludes by offering measured suggestions for legislative drafting and judicial reasoning.