Beyond The Veil Of Ignorance: Rawlsian Justice And The Jurisprudence Of Algorithmic Governance In India
Gregory Koshy Thomas, M.S. AmrithavarshiniOct 3, 202610.5281/zenodo.23124529pp. 192–20817 pages
Algorithmic systems increasingly mediate welfare delivery, policing, taxation, public services, and judicial administration in India. Their attraction lies in scale, speed, and the promise of consistent decision-making. Their constitutional difficulty lies in the fact that a computational output can distribute burdens and benefits without making its reasons intelligible to the person affected. This article develops a Rawlsian jurisprudence for Indian algorithmic governance. It argues that the original position and the veil of ignorance provide a disciplined test for institutional design: decision-makers should choose rules without knowing whether they will be digitally included or excluded, data-rich or data-poor, socially dominant or historically marginalised, or the beneficiary of an automated classification or its adverse subject. Rawls’s equal basic liberties, fair equality of opportunity, and difference principle are translated into constitutional requirements of legality, non-arbitrariness, proportionality, explainability, contestability, and protection against wrongful exclusion. The article situates this normative framework within Indian debates on Articles 14 and 21, privacy, Aadhaar-linked welfare, algorithmic bias, and administrative accountability. It proposes a rights-preserving architecture consisting of a public algorithm register, mandatory pre-deployment impact assessments, meaningful reasons, human review, independent audits, accessible remedies, and a non-waivable analogue route for essential entitlements. Rawlsian reasoning does not require India to reject automation. It requires the State to ensure that automation remains publicly justifiable to those who bear its risks.