From Discretion to Duty: Reconceptualising the Governor's Role under Articles 200 and 201 in Light of the Presidential Reference
J. Laxmi RajashekharOct 21, 202610.5281/zenodo.23536937pp. 703–71311 pages
The Governor's power over State Bills under Articles 200 and 201 of the Constitution of India has become one of the most contested sites of Indian federalism. In State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu (2025), a two-judge Bench of the Supreme Court read timelines into Article 200 and, invoking Article 142, declared ten Bills to have received deemed assent. Months later, a five-judge Bench answering a Presidential Reference under Article 143 rejected both judicially fixed timelines and deemed assent. It held that the Governor has only three options, may exercise discretion in choosing among them, and is answerable only to a 'limited mandamus' for prolonged, unexplained and indefinite inaction. This article argues that the Reference, read carefully, does not restore unfettered gubernatorial discretion. By foreclosing the pocket veto and confirming that inaction is justiciable, it accepts the premise that the Governor's power is held in trust for the constitutional scheme. Drawing on constitutional morality, the federal structure recognised in S.R. Bommai, and the Constituent Assembly's understanding of the office, the article proposes a framework of 'duty-bound discretion' resting on four obligations: to decide, to give reasons, to act in good faith, and to act within reasonable time. It contends that this framework fills the space the Reference left open, gives content to the undefined limited mandamus, and points towards institutional reform, including a constitutional amendment prescribing outer time limits, as the legitimate path to the certainty the Court declined to supply.